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Abstract 
Our focus is on the design of systems (pedagogical, technical, social) that encourage mathematical 
abstraction, a process we refer to as designing for abstraction. In this paper, we draw on detailed 
design experiments from our research on children’s understanding about chance and distribution to 
re-present this work as a case study in designing for abstraction. Through the case study, we 
elaborate a number of design heuristics that we claim are also identifiable in the broader literature 
on designing for mathematical abstraction. Our previous work on the micro-evolution of 
mathematical knowledge indicated that new mathematical abstractions are routinely forged in 
activity with available tools and representations, coordinated with relatively naïve unstructured 
knowledge. In this paper, we identify the role of design in steering the micro-evolution of 
knowledge towards the focus of the designer’s aspirations. A significant finding from the current 
analysis is the identification of a heuristic in designing for abstraction that requires the intentional 
blurring of the key mathematical concepts with the tools whose use might foster the construction 
of that abstraction. 
It is commonly recognized that meaningful design constructs emerge from careful analysis 
of children’s activity in relation to the designer’s own framework for mathematical abstraction. 
The case study in this paper emphasizes the insufficiency of such a model for the relationship 
between epistemology and design. In fact, the case study characterises the dialectic relationship 
between epistemological analysis and design, in which the theoretical foundations of designing for 
abstraction and for the micro-evolution of mathematical knowledge can co-emerge. 
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Designing for Mathematical Abstraction 
Our focus is on the design of systems (pedagogical, technical, social) that 
encourage mathematical abstraction, a process we refer to as designing for 
abstraction. We re-present previous work on young children’s changing meanings 
for randomness as a case study in designing for abstraction. Through the case 
study, we elaborate a number of design heuristics that we claim have broader 
significance in the literature on designing for mathematical abstraction. In 
searching for descriptions and explanations that better fit children’s activity in 
relation to our design activity, we treat theory building as a modelling exercise 
through which it appears that the conventional perception of the relationship 
between epistemology and design is insufficient. 
The aims of the original research that led to this paper can be expressed 
quite simply. We aimed to research young children’s changing meanings for 
randomness as those meanings evolved and were shaped by the digital tools that 
we made available to them. Since our concerns were to “address theoretical 
questions about the nature of learning in context” (Collins et al, 2004), we 
adopted a design research approach, culminating in a software tool, 
ChanceMaker. 
In earlier work, we reflected on the children’s meaning-making for 
randomness and distribution (Pratt, 2000), as it emerged through the design 
research, ultimately presenting a model for children’s micro-evolution of 
knowledge (Pratt and Noss, 2002). What was inescapable during that research was 
that we not only learned about the children’s meanings for randomness and 
distribution but we also became sensitized to the specific manner in which we 
could design tools that could act as a window on the children’s meaning-making. 
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In this paper, therefore, we now seek to focus explicitly on the rationale for the 
specific design decisions taken in that research and to identify heuristics to guide 
future design activity. 
We will present the case study chronologically since it is through the 
narrative that the relationship between epistemology and design becomes 
apparent. We begin by looking back at how we thought about epistemology and 
design at the start of the journey. 
Initial orientation towards epistemology and design 
When this research began (in 1994/5), the predominant view reported people’s 
understanding of randomness and probability as essentially misconceived and that 
matters of chance were mostly counter-intuitive. The fallibility of people’s 
conceptions of chance was reported, for example, in the seminal work by 
Kahneman and Tversky (for example, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982), 
who catalogued the heuristics people used, normally in conditions where subjects 
were required to make swift judgements without recourse to tools or indeed 
teachers. Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated how, under such circumstances, 
the heuristics people used were subject to systematic bias, resulting in errors and 
evidence of misconceptions.  The view that people’s probabilistic comprehension 
is misconceived was reinforced by many other research reports, including those of 
Lecoutre (1992) and Konold (1989), who gave alternative explanations for the 
tendency of people to use a non-probabilistic approach (the equiprobability bias 
and the outcome approach respectively), in which such situations were regarded 
as mere matters of happenstance or luck. 
Our own position was strongly influenced by the ideas of Smith, diSessa 
and Rochelle (1993). They asked if building new knowledge required replacing 
5 
misconceptions by better more normalised ways of thinking, what would be the 
foundations of such new knowledge? Replacing misconceptions 
unproblematically without any existing basis makes an anti-constructivist 
assumption and the search for misconceptions might support designers and 
teachers who need to be aware of existing conceptual structures that have 
developmental potential. We began our project with a belief that the 
misconceptions literature was reporting the effect of a particular research method 
and that by providing new tools, we might discover new ways to think about 
children’s understanding of randomness. We recognised that our design research 
would need to sensitise us to what children might already understand about 
randomness so that we might build tools that could perturb that understanding and 
promote the development of more sophisticated knowledge. 
In the literature on children’s understanding of randomness and probability, 
there were notable exceptions to the predominant misconceptions perspective, in 
particular the critique in Wilensky’s PhD thesis (1993) of the misconceptions 
approach and to some extent, the work on intuitions of chance by Fischbein 
(1975). Our orientation at the start of this research was consistent with that of 
Wilensky, aligned to the Constructionist school (Harel & Papert, 1991), which 
claims that, by offering microworlds in which children build meaningful products, 
the children will feel in control of the tools and become engaged in learning the 
mathematical ideas designed into the microworld. Constructionism suggests the 
efficacy of designing quasi-concrete virtual objects, instantiations of powerful 
mathematical ideas. By manipulating these on-screen objects, children can gain a 
sense of the power and limitations of the embodied mathematics (Papert, 1996), 
paralleling the construction of knowledge through the use of everyday artefacts in 
the material world: 
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“The principle is called the power principle or ‘what comes first, 
using it or 'getting it'?’ The natural mode of acquiring most 
knowledge is through use leading to progressively deepening 
understanding. Only in school... is this order systematically inverted. 
The power principle re-inverts the inversion.” 
(p. 98) 
Although our focus was on research rather than teaching, we believed that full 
engagement in exploratory activity would provide a window on children’s 
meanings for randomness, even as those meanings changed during activity (Noss 
and Hoyles, 1996). 
The emergence of ChanceMaker 
In this section, we describe the chronological development of ChanceMaker up to 
but not including its final stage. Even in our early attempts to bootstrap the design 
process, we had in mind a particular setting in which the evolving designs would 
be used. 
The children who would use the tools were aged between 9.11 and 11.1 
years in a primary school. By deciding to work with children from this school, 
which was relatively advanced in its deployment of technological resources, the 
distraction of technical obstacles would be minimised, allowing a tight focus on 
the children’s intuitions of the stochastic. 
The initial bootstrapping idea to trigger the iterative design process in the 
ChanceMaker study envisaged a simulation of a popular game, typically played at 
school fetes; players roll a penny down a slope and win if the coin avoids landing 
on any of the lines running across its path. The children were cast as the owners of 
the roll-a-penny stall in the school fete. We hoped that such a task would be seen 
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as purposeful by the children in keeping with our Constructionist stance. The 
software design (see Figure 1) featured facilities to control the design of the 
sloped board (the controls), the entry fee and the prizes (the money). 
 
Figure 1: An early version of ChanceMaker based on a popular game played in school fetes. The 
prototypes of ChanceMaker were developed in Boxer, a Logo derivative that allows the tools to be 
re-programmable by the user but at the same time provides structures through which the designer 
can choose to make some aspects more immediately visible than others. 
 
The player clicked the roll button and the animated coin rolled down the 
slope. As more coins were rolled, a distribution of results would be seen on the 
board as each attempt left a trace. Likely positions for the coin to land would 
show up as more dense patches on the board, not only emphasising variation in 
distances travelled but also indicating a distribution of distances through the 
density of the trace at different positions. 
The children were intrigued by the task of designing a profitable game and 
were further motivated by the idea that they might build an actual game, based on 
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their prototype, for the coming school fete. As a window on the children’s 
knowledge about randomness and distribution, the task was ineffective. Their 
focus was on the game itself and on financial calculations rather than on 
randomness and distribution. 
The design was therefore modified to emphasize the idea of statistical 
distribution, by giving the children control over the movement of the coin (Figure 
2). The howfar tool is a placeholder for the children’s programming commands 
that, when executed, determine how far the coin will roll. Children were able to 
enter any legal code into the howfar tool. 
 
Figure 2: The facility to control the movement of the coin was introduced 
 
The intention was to encourage a focus on the relationship between the 
howfar box and the distances rolled by successive coins. However, the children 
were somewhat underwhelmed by the task! The motivation witnessed in the 
previous iteration had dissipated; there seemed now to be no driving force behind 
the children’s activity. The children would carry out the task, responding politely 
to the researcher’s prompts and exhortations, but there was no sense of urgency in 
them needing to find out and explore for themselves. In this respect, the task again 
was ineffective as a window on their thinking-in-change about randomness and 
distribution. It seemed that there needed to be a certain level of desire in order that 
the window might not simply reflect the researcher’s agenda and in order to 
challenge the limits of the children’s knowledge. 
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We continued to search for a design that would encourage children to 
rediscover the sense of engagement without losing the focus on randomness and 
distribution. We decided that the howfar box in Figure 2 was insufficiently 
expressive and we might be able to introduce a greater sense of engagement if the 
children had more avenues for expression. It was difficult to see what we should 
build into the howfar box by default. We used the primitive, random. If we had 
used another primitive it was difficult to see how the children would introduce 
randomness without us telling them to do so, and if we put the command random 
in there ourselves as default, we were leading their thinking too strongly and we 
would probably not gain a refined sense of their understanding of randomness. 
We wondered what would happen if we asked the children to use their 
everyday knowledge of other random situations (or rather situations that seemed 
to involve randomness to us and might do so to the children). We built gadgets, 
simulations of everyday random generators, such as dice, lotteries, spinners. 
Figure 3 shows three of these new objects, now referred to as gadgets, alongside 
the roll-a-penny device. 
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Figure 3: We introduced a range of devices, simulators of everyday experiences of randomness, 
for example, tossing a die or a coin and drawing from a lottery. The children used these simulators 
to express how they thought the roll-a-penny gadget should work. 
 
In this design, the children were required to model the behaviour of the 
roll-a-penny device using a gadget as the controller. Each gadget could be 
activated by a command such as click dice or repeat 50 [click 
dice]. The behaviour of any gadget could be changed by editing its flipside.  
Figure 4 shows the flipside of the die gadget. 
 
Figure 4: Each device could be flipped to reveal a flipside, which indicated how the device 
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worked. Here, the computer ‘chooses’ at random from 1 to 5. The flipside could be edited so the 
children might decide, for example, that the die should choose from 1 to 6. 
 
By default, the roll-a-penny always went to the same distance of 4. We 
anticipated that the children would not believe that the roll-a-penny device 
should behave in this way and would search for a better model. For example, if 
the children believed that the roll-a-penny should behave somewhat like a die, 
they might edit the roll-a-penny flip-side to read click dice and then 
further edit the dice gadget to cover a range from 0 to 7 as appropriate for the 
roll-a-penny device. Essentially, the gadgets acted as a more expressive 
language to control the behaviour of the roll-a-penny device. 
Although the expressiveness of the design was improved, when we tested 
this design, it seemed that the task was too obscure. Although we had not yet 
found a solution to the problem of designing for both engagement and focus, we 
had in fact stumbled upon what turned out to be a key development in the task 
design, which we will pick up again later. 
Thoughts about epistemology and design, based on the iterative development of 
ChanceMaker 
The experience of these early iterations led to a re-evaluation of our position on 
epistemology and design, which needed to accommodate the experience of 
observing children’s levels of engagement and focus. Such factors clearly 
impacted on our ability to make inferences about meaning-making for 
randomness. In fact, these insights led to parallel research activity on a pair of 
connected constructs, purpose and utility (Ainley, Pratt and Hansen, 2006). 
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A purposeful task has a meaningful outcome for the learner in terms of an 
actual or virtual product, the solution of an engaging problem, or an argument or 
justification for a point of view. Designing tasks that engender such purpose is 
necessary but not sufficient for children to engage with the utility of ideas. In fact, 
the purpose of a task, as perceived by the learner, may be quite distinct from the 
intended learning outcomes. The purpose creates the necessity for the learner to 
use mathematical knowledge in pursuing the task and a benchmark for the child to 
recognise progress. Because the mathematical ideas are being used towards this 
end, children might come to appreciate utility: how and why the mathematics is 
useful, a form of understanding that has been largely ignored in the literature and 
is typically given little prominence in schools. Consider this example. Schools 
typically emphasize the learning of mode, median and mean as algorithms but an 
understanding of the utility of average would involve an appreciation of when 
average might be deployed as a useful idea. We regard gaining an understanding 
of utility as an essential element of mathematical abstraction. 
Papert’s Power Principle states that technology can allow children to learn 
mathematics through its use. We came to understand that, in order to build an 
appropriate window on the children’s meanings for randomness, we needed to 
connect purpose and utility; not only must the task be seen as purposeful, as was 
the case with our first bootstrapping design, but also randomness and distribution 
must be seen as having utility. At this stage, we had not succeeded in connecting 
purpose and utility but the failure of the designs to date had opened up for us the 
potential significance of utility in children’s abstracting process. 
At about that time, we had also in fact stumbled upon a break-through idea: 
whereas previously we saw gadgets as mechanisms for expressing how the roll-
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a-penny device should operate, the gadgets could themselves be broken and 
perhaps mending the gadgets could become the sought after purposeful task. The 
idea of mending a gadget took hold of our imaginations since it promised a 
constructionist “building-like” approach towards the study. We could reduce the 
obscurity of the previous iteration by removing the need to connect the other 
gadgets to the roll-a-penny device and simply offer all the gadgets as potentially 
broken. The challenge would then be to identify which gadgets were ‘working 
properly’ (that is to say, not broken) and to mend them. By careful design of the 
tools for mending, we intended to offer a purposeful task that would be likely to 
lead to the construction of utilities for randomness and distribution. The lack of 
clarity in the meaning of ‘working properly’ acted as a prompt for children to test 
out personal conjectures and provided a window through which the researcher 
might appreciate how the children thought coins, spinners and dice should behave. 
When the children felt they had some appreciation of which gadgets were 
not working properly, they would be challenged to mend them. Indeed, as the task 
involved the children in making decisions about the performance of the gadget 
and about how to modify that performance, the task would we hoped, be seen as 
playful and engaging and encourage the children to be careless about their own 
naivety. 
In summary, our initial epistemological position oriented us towards a 
constructionist perspective on the mathematical knowledge but the early iterations 
in the emergence of ChanceMaker enabled us to recognize the fundamental need 
to design a connection between purpose as might be construed by children and the 
utility of randomness and distribution. By stumbling upon the key role that 
mending gadgets might play, we understood that knowledge about randomness 
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was defined by knowing what was not random (for example, we might regard a 
process as random because we are unable to predict its outcome). We describe in 
more detail in the next section what this really meant about children’s 
construction of meanings about randomness but even at this stage we understood 
that offering opportunities for mending gadgets would provide a window on how 
they anticipate randomness and so reveal their meanings for what was and what 
was not random. 
The maturation of ChanceMaker 
The task associated with the mature version of ChanceMaker was presented to the 
children in two parts. The first section below focuses on the initial challenge. 
Later, we describe the second part of the task. First then, it was explained that we 
were developing gadgets to behave like various familiar objects such as coins, 
spinners and dice. The children were asked to help us by playing with these 
gadgets and identifying which ones they thought were behaving ‘properly’. 
Identifying which gadgets were not working properly 
In the mature version of ChanceMaker1, we offered a range of gadgets; three are 
shown in Figure 5. 
                                                




Figure 5: Three gadgets from ChanceMaker were the coin, the spinner and the dice. In each 
case, the strength tool could be pulled and let go in order to create an animated representation of 
‘throwing’ the gadget. 
 
The children were able to simulate the throwing or tossing of the gadget, 
either by pulling on the strength control, the black disc beneath the gadget itself, 
or by clicking directly on the gadget in order to replicate an experiment using the 
same strength as last time. The task was to decide which of the gadgets were 
working properly and which were not. 
When children worked with ChanceMaker, we observed them articulating 
four expert-like meanings for randomness. In each instance, we give one example 
for illustrative purposes, though there were many such occurrences in the original 
data: 
(i) Unpredictability – when the children were unable to predict the 
next outcome, they would tend to regard the gadget as random. For 
example, in response to the question, “Do you think there is any 
number which is harder to get than any other number?” one child 
commented, “No . . . because it just comes out at random and any 
number could come out at any time so you don’t really know which 
one is going to come out or which one is not going to come out.” 
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(ii) Unsteerability – when the children were unable to control the next 
outcome, they would typically view the gadget as random. For 
example, when asked to summarize how he would decide on 
randomness, one child responded, “Well, you decide by . . . if 
you’re not controlling it or if you’re not affecting it by doing 
anything, and if it’s like not bad weather or anything or nothing’s 
blowing it over or anything, that will be quite random, but if the 
wind was blowing it or you were putting force or it or something 
then it’s not that random.” 
(iii) Irregularity – when there appeared to be no sustainable pattern in 
results, the children would regard the gadget as random. For 
example, when asked how he would test the fairness of a dice, one 
child answered, “Testing it, I’d roll it and if it kept on going on one 
or another then I might think it’s got like a magnet or something 
inside it . . . I’d test it about ten, fifteen times.” 
(iv) Fairness – when  the gadget appeared to be fair, the children would 
tend to regard the gadget as random. For example, one set of 
questions in the interview was designed to ascertain how the child 
thought about two spinners, one of which had uniform sectors and 
another, which had unequal size sectors. On the first uniform 
spinner, children often expressed concerns that the spinner may not 
be unsteerable but nevertheless recognized that there was no 
particular bias towards one number. In contrast, the same child 
would often regard the non-uniform spinner as non-random. One 
child commented, “No, because whoever made this, made the one 
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and the three bigger so you’ll get the one and the three most of the 
time.” 
We say expert-like because at face value their meanings for randomness 
appear consistent with much expert opinion. However, we observed the children 
shifting quite rapidly between the four meanings, choosing whichever was 
triggered by seemingly superficial (from the mathematical point of view) aspects 
of the gadget or random generator. For example, a child referred to the 
unsteerability of a device and moments later referred instead to its 
unpredictability; the fact that situations that were not controlled were often not 
predictable apparently encouraged children to express these resources 
interchangeably. 
At the same time, they would often fail to problematise potential conflicts. 
Thus, certain spinners might have been regarded as unfair (and so not random), 
because the sectors were unequal, and at the same time irregular, unsteerable or 
unpredictable (and so random), because they were not exactly able to determine 
the outcomes. In practice, such conflicts, which might have led to a new 
conceptualization of randomness, were not articulated; the children would 
categorize the spinner as random if they happened to pay attention to the 
unpredictability and not random if they happened to consider the non-uniform 
configuration of the spinner. 
Thoughts about epistemology and design based on identifying broken gadgets 
In trying to make sense of this data in which children quickly switched between 
meanings according to superficial (from our point of view) contextual stimuli, we 
regarded these meanings as, at best, weakly connected pieces of fragmented 
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knowledge. Perhaps even more significantly, the children would not articulate 
meanings for long-term randomness. 
It is in the literature on physics education that we found the most persuasive 
theory of conceptual change that accounts for such fragmentation. diSessa (1993) 
has proposed that knowledge is, at least initially, made up of many small 
unstructured heterogeneous particles of knowledge, which he calls 
phenomenological primitives, or p-prims for short. P-prims are abstracted directly 
from experience. One characteristic of p-prims is that they contain priorities that 
shape how and when those pieces of knowledge are used to make sense of 
phenomena.  As p-prims become recognized by the organism as more reliable in 
relation to their consistency, they are more likely to be called upon in the future as 
tools for abstracting. Gradually, through a process diSessa calls tuning towards 
expertise (1993), clusters of connected p-prims will begin to appear 
simultaneously triggered by similar phenomena. diSessa refers to these clusters as 
coordination classes, roughly analogous to concepts. We were impressed by the 
extent to which this theory provides explanatory power for the inconsistency both 
between and within children (see, for example, Pratt & Noss, 2002). 
In order to promote tuning towards expertise, we needed to allow and 
encourage the children to test the limits of their abstractions, that is, to test out 
their personal conjectures about the behaviour of the quasi-concrete objects that 
we were offering. Otherwise, how would children come to an appreciation of the 
lack of explanatory power in their current internal meanings about long-term 
aggregated behaviour? The aim then was not to classify such abstractions as 
misconceived but to support children in recognizing that they do not have 
powerful explanations, much in the manner of classical cognitive conflict 
approaches (Piaget, 1963). 
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We saw the second part of the task, mending the broken gadgets, as an 
opportunity to use new tools that would build in feedback mechanisms that were 
designed to increase the likelihood that children would identify the lack of 
explanatory power of their fragmented knowledge pieces in certain situations. 
 
Figure 6: The workings of the die gadget allow the child to continue playing at top level by 
clicking on the image of the gadget but also to use the tools to mend the gadget. The tools include 
a list or chart of previous results, the possibility of keeping a chart to compare later with a new 
chart, the total number of throws so far, an option to repeat quickly many throws (how many can 
be set by the child) and, most importantly, the facility to edit the workings of the box. Here, the die 
is choosing randomly with a bias towards throwing a 6. A child might edit this so that the die 
chooses from 1 to 6 with no bias. 
 
Figure 6 shows the mending tools inside the die gadget. The other gadgets 
were similarly organized. The children were able to continue to play with the 
gadget itself as if at top-level or repeat quickly many throws of the die. It was 
possible to inspect the results or indeed to graph those results. In Figure 6, the 
child has simulated the roll of the die 10 times. The results can been seen as a list 
in the Results Box or as a graph, here depicted as a pie chart. 
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The workings box was introduced to the children as how the gadget 
works. So, in Figure 6, the die “chooses” between 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6 and 6. No 
further detail on how the die might do this was offered and none was asked for. 
The researcher also demonstrated how the workings box could be edited so that 
the gadget could have a different set of choices. Thus, in Figure 7, the workings 
box has been edited so that the die chooses, in more conventional style, between 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. The child has simulated the throwing of the die 10 times and a 
pie chart has been generated. Typically, on seeing such a graph, a child might 
decide there are too many 6’s in the workings box! 
 
Figure 7: Here, the child has modified the workings of the die gadget so that the die chooses 
randomly from 1 to 6. However, the pie chart, after ten throws only, seems to indicate a bias 
towards 6, and it would be typical now if the child were to continue editing the working box, 
perhaps by removing the 6! 
Thus, two important feedback mechanisms were i. the facility to observe the 
behaviour of animated gadgets and ii. to examine the lists of results and the 
graphs, such as pie charts and pictograms. Of course, children regularly ignore or 
do not perceive the significance of feedback but by setting the activity within a 
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purposeful task, we expected the desire to understand would minimize that 
possibility. 
In making our design decisions, we sought to emphasize the lack of 
explanatory power in certain situations of the child’s fragmented knowledge (in 
the lists below, the design decision relate to the final design shown in Figures 6 
and 7): 
• We made available prior results so that children might realize that 
apparent patterns were not sustained over a longer period. 
• Children, who felt that the order of the numbers on the spinner was 
important, could edit the workings box to test whether different 
orders of numbers would influence the spinner’s behaviour.  
• We expected from our early designs and from the literature that some 
children would predict that the outcome from the coin and many of 
the other gadgets to be influenced by how they threw the gadget. 
Hence, we provided a strength control through which they could throw 
the gadget with differing strengths. In fact, the strength mechanism 
was a redundant control. In other words, the strength control had no 
influence over the mathematics although it did extend or reduce the 
time of the animation. Thus, for example, the coin would spin longer 
or shorter depending on the strength of the throw but whether it would 
land as a head or a tail did not in any way depend on the value of the 
strength. In practice, children needed to explore the strength control for 
extended periods before they rejected the idea that the value of the 
strength had an impact on the outcome. 
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Cobb et al (2003) have recently argued that design research offers an 
approach in which theory cannot only be tested but can do work. The above list 
demonstrates some instances of how design could empower children to test 
conjectures. The knowledge-in-pieces perspective on the micro-evolution of 
knowledge makes an important prediction: The fragmented knowledge could, 
under appropriate conditions, evolve structures through tuning towards expertise. 
This prediction inspired us to move beyond the commonly espoused model of 
cognitive conflict by seeking to support recognition of the power of certain 
situated yet normative abstractions and we designed our system to mobilize 
current knowledge towards this end. 
In our experience, there is usually some element of what the child understands 
that can be regarded as a root of expert knowledge. We need to elaborate what we 
mean by ‘root’. In diSessa’s terminology, fragmented knowledge manifests itself 
through articulations, often apparently inconsistent in nature, that the teacher or 
designer might note. Some of that inferred knowledge might not be inconsistent 
with expert knowledge even though it is likely to be different in scope. The 
child’s knowledge might be more situated or even too generally applied; its power 
might not be recognised in the face of competing fragments of knowledge. For 
example, the ChanceMaker children had an appreciation of the unpredictability, 
irregularity and unsteerability of randomness. How might these meanings be used 
as starting points to support a process of tuning towards expertise, which might 
respond to the conflict generated by the earlier design decisions? What decisions 
might we make to increase the likelihood of triggering p-prims out of which 
expert knowledge might develop? 
In order to support tuning towards expertise, we needed to identify and 
exploit what we recognized as the children’s current knowledge. We have already 
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described, for example, how the ChanceMaker children had an appreciation of 
short-term randomness, articulated through local meanings such as fairness. In 
order to facilitate tuning towards expertise, we needed to design opportunities for 
building on that knowledge, as described below. 
• We sought to mobilize (in the sense of tuning towards expertise) 
children’s keen understanding of fairness, as attached to the 
appearance of a gadget, so that their notion of fairness was re-attached 
to the appearance of the pie chart and the workings box. 
• We also sought to mobilize the children’s appreciation of 
unpredictability by facilitating a recognition of its limitation to only 
short-term randomness, introducing through the design of the tools the 
possibility of predictability in relation to the aggregate over a longer 
term. We intended that tuning towards expertise might involve a move 
whereby local meanings for randomness and fairness would be 
mobilized to construct global meanings for predictability in the long 
term. 
• Furthermore, we hoped that the repeat tool might enable the children to 
try out many cases to test out whether their idea worked in the longer 
term and to discover that what had been unpredictable in the short term 
seemed in some aggregated sense to be predictable in the long term. 
Mending the gadgets 
The second challenge to the children was to mend the broken gadgets using the 
tools found by opening up the gadget. We observed the children attempting to 
mend the gadgets, in particular by using the workings box. Details of their activity 
have been reported elsewhere (see by way of more detailed illustration the activity 
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of Anne and Rebecca in Pratt & Noss, 2002). Here, bearing in mind our focus on 
design, we give a précis of that activity. 
The children tried out different configurations and inspected the Results 
Box and the workings box to understand the consequence of their mending 
actions. Typically, they would notice how the pie chart was not uniform, which 
conflicted, it seemed, with their expectation of fairness. The children would edit 
the workings box accordingly. So, if the pie chart contained too many 6’s, they 
might remove a 6 from the workings box. Sometimes, by responding in this 
direct way to the data, the children would under-represent an outcome in the 
workings box. So, a die with workings box that read 
choosefrom [1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6] might by chance generate a 
surplus of 2’s. In response, the children might edit the workings box to read 
choosefrom [1 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6]. It typically took substantial 
experimentation before they experimented with a workings box that read 
choosefrom [1 2 3 4 5 6]. Even then they might respond to, say, a large 
number of 1’s by editing the workings box once more to become 
choosefrom [2 3 4 5 6]. 
Eventually, the children would usually realize that 
choosefrom [1 2 3 4 5 6] would only mend the dice gadget if the dice 
were thrown many times. We characterized the way children expressed this 
construction with the phrase, “the more times you throw the dice, the more even 
is the pie chart”. When challenged by the researchers with a workings box 
which did not have a uniform configuration, the children were typically once 
more puzzled and, after further experimentation, would articulate (through mouse-
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clicks in the medium of ChanceMaker as well as natural language) the idea that 
“the more even is the dice’s workings box, the more even is its pie chart” and in 
some cases “the more times you through the dice, the more even is the pie chart, 
provided the workings box is even”. 
The children moved from one gadget to another and we were struck by how, 
with each new gadget, they typically began the search for meaning from the 
beginning, not using the heuristics that they seemed to have constructed from the 
previous gadgets. In fact, since the internal structure was identical across the 
gadgets, we were surprised as observers at the fresh struggle for meaning with 
each gadget. However, we also noted that when all else failed, when they could 
find no other explanation for the new gadget’s behaviour, children would often 
“remember” that “the more times you throw the dice, the more even is its pie 
chart” and “the more uniform is the dice’s workings box, the fairer is its pie 
chart”, conjecturing that perhaps this rule works also for the new gadget. Indeed, 
as the children became familiar with more gadgets, the time needed for them to 
become familiar with the new gadget and re-use the same heuristics for making 
sense of the gadget’s behaviour reduced. Eventually, some children were able to 
anticipate outcomes. In one case near the end of two hours of activity, for 
example, the children were challenged by the researcher, “What I had really 
wanted was for the ones to have a very good chance and the twos to have only a 
fairly good chance.” One of the children immediately edited the workings box to 
read choose-from [1 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 6]. In the context of the earlier 
struggles to make sense of the gadget’s behaviour, this was strong evidence that 
the children were using the workings box as a predictor of behaviour. 
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Thoughts about epistemology and design based on mending the gadgets 
Activity with the workings box led to a sense of the utility of distribution, 
or at least this situated version of the broader mathematical concept, in that 
distribution could be seen as a stochastic control over how a gadget works, both in 
the short term and in the long term. In retrospect, we see that we designed for 
purposeful activity that was optimized for the construction of situated utilities for 
distribution because distribution in the form of the workings box acted as a 
stochastic control over the long-term behaviour of the gadgets.  
At the outset, there was no evidence to suggest the children could use the 
workings box to anticipate outcomes. Indeed, most of the early activity was 
characterized by surprise when the actual outcomes failed to match expectations. 
Only with experience and the construction of relatively reliable situated 
abstractions did the children begin to find that what happened matched their 
predictions. At this point, the workings box became something more than a way 
of changing what might happen; it became a way of predicting what would 
happen. In that sense the workings box could be thought of as a representation 
or embodiment of a piece of mathematics, a formalism for describing probability 
distribution. 
From the design perspective, the workings box seems to embody a fusion 
between control and representation. Whereas the utility of the workings box as a 
control was that it could change how the gadget behaved, the utility of the 
workings box as a representation was that it could describe how the gadget 
would behave. This ambiguous role for the workings box appeared to provide 
the link between informal activity and formal representation, but the link was only 
27 
activated in practice because of the design success in connecting purpose and 
utility. 
We referred to the first heuristic, “the more times you throw the dice, the 
more even is the pie chart”, as N, and the second heuristic, “the more uniform is 
the dice’s workings box, the fairer is its pie chart”, as D. We also referred to the 
co-ordination of these two as N.D. In fact N, D and N.D are examples of what 
Noss and Hoyles (1996) call situated abstractions, in which abstraction is 
conceived, not so much as pulling away from context, but as a process of 
constructing mathematical meanings by drawing context into abstraction, 
populating abstraction with objects and relationships of the setting. We began to 
see connections between situated abstractions and diSessa’s knowledge-in-pieces. 
In fact, in using situated abstractions, rather than p-prims, as our analytical 
construct, we apply the knowledge-in-pieces metaphor at a somewhat larger grain 
size. Whereas p-prims are largely subconscious and so small in granularity that 
they can scarcely be represented in language (though diSessa tentatively attempts 
to do this by referring, for example, to the p-prim “I push it, it moves”), we prefer 
to think of abstraction at a level more commensurate with learners’ conscious, 
expressible and therefore observable articulations. 
The knowledge-in-pieces framework makes a second prediction: children’s 
abstraction would be sensitive to context, since small changes in the situation 
would trigger quite different p-prims. 
We felt that our epistemological position could now begin to articulate under what 
circumstances children might re-use pieces of knowledge in new settings, and 
how knowledge, which is becoming tuned towards expertise, be “transferred” 
across such settings? 
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It appeared to us that situated abstractions are likely to remain un-cued in 
new situations precisely because the relevant pieces of knowledge are not 
connected to that situation. We found it helpful, therefore, to think of a contextual 
neighbourhood surrounding pieces of knowledge. The neighbourhood captures 
the domain over which the idea has been encountered and found to be powerful by 
the child in explaining the on-screen behaviour. The short version of what we 
propose is that mathematical abstraction is a process of broadening that contextual 
neighbourhood, rather than of de-contextualization. 
Discussion and summary 
We set out to elaborate a case study of design research, seeking to identify design 
heuristics that emerged. We also aimed to convey the dialectic relationship 
between designing for abstraction and the designers’ perspective on the micro-
evolution of mathematical knowledge. We now summarise the situation. 
First we discuss the design heuristics that have been illustrated through this 
case study. A starting point was that a knowledge-in-pieces framework for 
understanding conceptual change led us to envisage the design task, not so much 
as supporting the replacement of misconceptions with normalized knowledge, as 
seeking to re-prioritise underlying p-prims. 
We therefore designed to enable children to test out their personal 
conjectures and to support enhancement of priorities that might be attached to 
pieces of knowledge that we could envisage might lie at the root of normalized 
knowledge, i.e. standard knowledge, socially accepted by the mathematical 
community. Our window on children’s knowledge had to be sensitive to the 
children's pre-existing meanings for randomness and distribution. In practice, we 
recognized the importance of fairness, a meaning for randomness articulated by 
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all of our sample children and generally associated with the immediate physical 
appearance of the gadgets. So we designed tools such as the pie chart to 
encourage realignment of the notion of fairness with that of equally likely 
outcomes.  
 To summarise, we can state the above design activity in terms of two 
emergent design heuristics: 
1. Enable the testing by children of their personal conjectures. 
2. Seek to enhance the explanatory power of knowledge that might offer a 
route to normalized knowledge. 
In order to execute the second heuristic, we needed to design a task which 
would be likely to engage the child in activity, focussed on the key mathematical 
concepts of randomness and distribution. In effect, we designed a window on that 
mathematical activity through a task seen as purposeful by the child. The task was 
carefully designed so that in pursuing his aims, the child would be likely to come 
to appreciate the utility of distribution. Thus, the task design connected purpose 
and utility by inventing a novel representation for distribution and presenting it as 
a means of control over core mathematical activity. The children used each 
workings box as a control over the behaviour of the corresponding gadget; 
subsequently each workings box became a means for the children to predict the 
behaviour of the gadgets. In this sense, the workings box fused control with 
representation, enabling a blurring of the informal and the formal and providing a 
natural connection between the purposeful activity of the task and the key 
mathematical concept that we wanted the children to address. In short, a third and 
fourth design heuristic emerged: 
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3. Construct a task design that will be likely to generate purposeful 
activity and tools that encourage the construction of utilities for the 
key mathematical concepts. 
4. Identify or design representations of key mathematical concepts that 
can be used as control points needed by the child to pursue their aim.  
We can now revisit other work and try to identify post-hoc whether these 
four heuristics appear relevant to their designs. To explain what we mean, we turn 
to a familiar example for readers of this journal. Young children using the Logo 
turtle to draw pictures or create animations may already have fuzzy ways of 
thinking about distance or angle. By using commands such as FD 50 and RT 
90, they test out those personal conjectures and begin to revise their ideas through 
use. These commands are acting as controls over the drawing/animation activity 
and become representations in the sense that gradually many of these children will 
be able to predict the result of issuing the command and even create procedures 
where the result of the procedure is imagined in advance of execution. The utility 
of angle will be seen in terms of its power to produce pictures and more generally 
create or describe movement. What the turtle graphics commands like FD 50 
manage to do is to combine computation – it will do something potentially useful 
when run - with representation – what it will do can be predicted from the 
representation. In earlier work, we named this duality 'auto-expressive':  
"environments in which the only way to manipulate and reconstruct objects is to 
express explicitly the relationships between them" (Noss, Healy & Hoyles, 1997, 
p.5). The same is true of the workings box. 
Put this way, it is now possible to understand the failure of earlier iterations 
of ChanceMaker, in which the gadgets were used to express how the roll-a-
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penny device should behave. The immature gadgets were not representing some 
generic mathematical idea; rather they were limited to the functioning of an 
everyday phenomenon such as a coin or die. In this sense, they did not possess the 
expressiveness and generality of a mathematical representation. In contrast, the 
workings box in each mature gadget contained within itself the dual 
characteristics of controlling behaviour of the gadget and representing a powerful 
mathematical idea. 
Our second aim for the case study was to articulate the relationship between 
epistemology and design. Our case study highlights the evolution of this 
reciprocal relationship.  It is commonly understood that “the design of a tool 
reflects the designer’s intentions, thoughts and compromises” (Yerushalmy, 1999, 
p. 171) but in our emphasis, in effect, we add the reciprocal that the designer’s 
epistemological understanding reflects the design of the tool. Taken together, 
these two statements capture the dialectical nature of the relationship between 
epistemology and design. Below we trace the manner in which as a result of the 
design process our understanding of epistemology changed. 
Our original stance, essentially Constructionist, became more refined 
through several stages. Our early experiences in trying to bootstrap the design 
research helped us to recognize the significance and non-triviality of designing a 
task through which the child’s purpose for the task leads to the construction of 
utility for a key mathematical concept. Such insights have led us to review our 
stance on knowledge construction to incorporate the notions of purpose and utility 
as discussed in the section on Thoughts about epistemology and design, based on 
the iterative development of ChanceMaker. Designing for abstraction then has to 
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consider what children might find purposeful and to invent tasks that optimize the 
chance that such a purpose might lead to the construction of utility.  
A second change in our epistemological understanding took place. We 
found that adopting diSessa's framework gave us insight into the evolution of the 
children's thinking in terms of the situated abstractions, N, D and N.D. Situated 
abstractions (SA) seemed to offer a way of thinking about knowledge at a grain 
size more aligned to the children’s articulations than the sub-conscious behaviour 
captured by diSessa’s p-prims. In contrast, but complementary to, the p-prim idea, 
the notion of situated abstraction privileges the explicit and expressed rather than 
the implicit and intuitive. In characterising expression-with-tool, the evolution of 
the children's thinking that led to the N, D and N.D. SAs were firmly embedded 
within the toolset. This naturally led us to asking what, if anything, might be 
'transferred' in this process. While the evolution of conceptual change at the p-
prim level involves reorganisation and evolution, we found it helpful in the SA 
analysis to think in terms of contextual neighbourhoods over which SAs were 
seen to apply. Of course the determination of contextual neighbourhoods was, as 
best we can judge, entirely implicit - even subconscious - much as diSessa's p-
prims.  
Thought of in this light, therefore, designing for mathematical abstraction 
becomes a challenge to create a domain for the articulation of situated 
abstractions, and the means by which the contextual neighbourhoods can be 
refined and expanded. The breadth or limitation of a contextual neighbourhood is 
appreciated through recognising (possibly sub-consciously) the relevance of prior 
knowledge to ongoing activity. By fusing control over mathematical activity with 
the representation of that mathematics, the designer offers the opportunity for 
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activation and transformation of the contextual neighbourhood as additional or 
restricted utility of the mathematical concept. 
We have shown through this case study how designing for abstraction can 
generate new theory not only about design in the form of heuristics, as 
summarised in the first part of this discussion, but also, as in the second part, 
about the mutually generative nature of epistemology and design. 
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